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[35 C.2d 93; 218 P.2CS 8501

[L. A. No. 20727. In Bank. Apr. 11, 1950.]

of RUBY SARGAVAK, Deceased. J. G. OHANNESON et &1., Respondents, v. ADRINE LAMBRINIDOU
et &1., Appellants; H. KURKJIAN et &1., Contestants and
Respondents.

~.'Il"~+ .....

Wills-Testamen~

Writinp-Intent.-Before an instrument
may be probated as a will it must appear from its terms, viewed
in the light of the surrounding circumstances, that it was executed with testamentary intent. The testator must have intended by the particular instrument offered for probate, to
make a revocable disposition of his property to take effect on
his death.
Id.-Testamentary Writings-Showing of Intent-Extrinsic
Evidence.-Regardless of the language of an allegedly testamentary instrument, extrinsic evid~nce may be introduced to
show that it was not intended by the testator to be effective
aaawilL
leL-Testamentary Writings-Showing of Intent-Extrinsic
Evidence.-Since extrinsic evidence is admissible to show the
absence of testamentary intention, it does not become inadmissible because it does so by showing another intention.
Writings-Showing of Intent-Extrinsic
.. Evidence.-Oral declarations of the testatrix before and after
the execution of the instrument in question are admissible, if
offered for the purpose of ascertaining the intent with which
instrument was ~xecuted, and not for the purpose of provthe meaning the testatrix attributed to specific provisions
admitted will.
IcL-'J~est:amentary Writings-Showing of Intent.-Although
was uncontradicted and unimpeached evidence that deceannoyance with the niece of her deceased husband and
niece's daughter prompted the writing of the alleged
·AO.lograp,n1C instrument reciting that she left "everything she
two named men, but there was nothing in the evidence
the trial court which clearly negatived the testamentary
"'}loU"".'\J'" carried by those words, and there was other evidecedent intended to make the disposition of her
manifested by the terms of the instrument, the evi26. Cal.Jur. 868; 57 Am.Jur. 45.
Dig. Beferencea: [1] Wills, § 201; [2-5] Willa, § 202; [8]
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dence supported a finding that such instrument was uecuted
with testamentary intent.
.
[8] Id.-Testamental'J Writings-Dual Character.-The inclusion
of non testamentary provisions in an instrument with those of
a testamentary nature does not make the instrument inoperative &&I a will.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County admitting to probate a codicil to a will which
had been previously admitted to probate. Kurtz Kauffman,
Judge. Affirmed.
Robert M. Dulin, Melvin E. Fink, Spurgeon Avakian and
Schell & Delamer for Appellants.
O. W. Byrer, Charles E. Hobart, Cameron & Perkins and
W. E. Oameron for Respondents.
THE COURT ..-Contestants appeal from an order admitting
a holographic instrument to probate as a codicil toa previously
admitted witnessed will. Ruby Sargavak died March 22, 194!1.
By a formal will drawn by respondent Ohanneson as her
attorney and executed July 9, 1945, she left all her property
to the appellants. Respondent Mahdesian, as executor under
that will, offered it for probate on March 31, 1947. On May 6.
1947, respondent Ohanneson offered the following instrument
for probate as a codicil to that will:
AI 1566 W -29th St.
Los Angeles 7. Cal.
Sep 29.1946
Sunday Evening
To WHOM IT MAY OONCERN:
I the writer---:.Mrs Rqby Salogavak waritS--everyonetokriow
that she is writing these lines of her own free will-no one is
putting her eI or urging her to do it. She leaves everything
she has to her Boy Sam Mahdesian & her layer, J. G. Ohanneson-6he gives them power of attorney to divide what is left
of her belongings to them. She specifically advises to give
,nothing what so ever to Mrs. Lillian Shooshan-she is no
relation nor friend of hers~Mrs. Sargavak has been more
than kind to her. just because she begged us to help her for
a little time-Mrs. Sargavak would rather help her very own
nieces & grand nieces & perfect strangers, who are truly in
need of help. God has been good to us, she did not appreciate
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goodness of the Lord to her. All honor & glory unto his
and Holy Name! Mrs. Ruby Sargavak.
',P. S. It is 8 o'clock, I am very tired-Ruby Sargavak."
contested the admission of this instrument on
ground that testatrix did not intend it as a testamentary
.di!Irpoisltl:on of her property. They introduced without objecevidence to show that testatrix intended the instrument
an authorization to respondents to eject Mrs. Lillian Shoofrom the testatrix's house. Respondent Mahdesian testito declarations of the testatrix that the allegedly disposi, provisions were intended only as a statement that her
:att:OrJley and her executor were to dispose of her property
to the terms of the will of JUly 9, 1945. Respondent
,UlilaIlDe~SOlll, as the only proponent of the codicil, offered no
{,M.·nn'"rli"t."'.... evidence, relying solely upon the allegedly clear
of the instrument. The trial court found that the
'im;ltrtlmlmt was executed with testamentary intent and adit to probate as a codicil to the will.
question is raised as to compliance with Probate Code.
_lIICt:W\j,U 53. or as to Mrs. Sargavak's testamentary capacity.
contend only that the uncontradicted evidence
discloses that the testatrix did not execute the instru&llJJ.ellt with testamentary intent. Respondent, however, urges
the extrinsic evidence was improperly admitted and
.,,~~uu not be considered on that issue. He contends that when
is clear and tmambiguous on its face, extrinsic evidence
be admitted to show that it was not a will. This concannot be upheld.
Before an instrument may be probated as a will it
a.!~n appear from its terms. viewed in the light of the surcircumstances, that it was executed with testaintent. The! testator must have intended, by the
.1~p.!~i~~ulllU' instrument offered for probate, to make a revocable
of his property to take effect upon his death.
Richardson, 94 Cal. 63 [29 P. 484, 15 L.R.A. 635];
_",un, of Spencer, 87 Cal.App.2d 591 [197 P.2d 351] ; Haberg,v. Vincent, 2 Ves.Jr. 204; Succession of Torlage, 202 La.
,[12 So.2d 683J ; Mayhew v. Wt"lhelm, 249 Mich. 640 [229
459J ; In re McOune's Estate, 265 Pa. 523 [109 A. 156J ;
"~4ta~e of Button, 209 Cal. 325, 331 [287 P. 964J; In re Wt"l1UJ9~18: _Estate, (Tex.Civ.App.) 135 S.W.2d 1078; OZark v.
130 Va. 99 [107 S.E. 730]; Thompson, Willa, § 12.)
UI
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It bears emphasis that we are here concerned not with the
meaning of the instrument, but with the intention with which
it was executed.· [2] Regardless of the language of the
allegedly testamentary instrument, extrinsic evidence may
be introduced to show that it was not intended by the testator
to be effective as a will. (Estate of Janes, 18 Cal.2d 512, 515
[116 P.2d 438] ; Austin v. First Trust &- Savings Bank, 343
m. 406, 414 [175 N.E. 554] ; In re Kemp's Will, 37 Del 514,
523 [186 A. 890] ; In re Estate of Soper, 196 Minn. 60 [264
N.W. 427] ; Estate of Kenyon, 42 Cal.App.2d 423 [109 P.2d
38].) Thus, an instrument that clearly appears testamentary
may nevertheless be shown by extrinsic evidence to have been
executed in jest (Nichols v. Nichols, 2 Phill.Ecc. 180 j Trevelyan
v. Trevelyan, 1 Phill.Ecc. 149), or as a threat to induce action
by an interested party (Lister v. Smith, 3 S.&T. 282), or
under the misapprehension that the instrument was a mortgage (In re Williams' Estate (Tex.Civ.App.), 135 S.W.2d
1078), or to induce the "legatee" to engage in illicit relations
with the testator (Fleming v. Morrison, 187 Mass. 120 [72
N.E. 499]), or to relieve the maker from annoyance by a'
would-be legatee. (Estate of Siemers, 202 Cal. 424, 435 [261
P.298J ; see 1 Page, Wills, § 53.)
Respondent relies upon a dictum in Estate of PageZ, 52
Cal.App.2d 38, 42 [125 P.2d 853], that, although extrinsic
evidence can be admitted to show that the writer did not intend
the writing in question to operate as a will, such evidence cannot be admitted to show that he intended it to operate as an
instrument different from what on its face it purports to be.
Respondent therefore contends that the evidence is inadmissible because it shows that the testatrix intended to execute
a power of attorney. [3] The intention of the testatrix is
here material only in showing that she did not intend that the
instrument operate as a will. Since extrinsic evidence is admissible to show the absence of testamentary intention, it does
not become inadmissible because it does 80 by showing another
intention.
[4] The extrinsic evidence in this case consists .for the most
part of the oral declarations of the testatrix before and after
the execution of the instrumenrin question. Such declarations,
-There fa an analogy in the use of extrinsic evidence, including
subsequent acts and deelaratious of tho. grantor, to prove delive~ of
a deed, likewise turning on a question of intention independent of
the terms of the deed itself. (Whitlow v. Durst, 20 Ca1.2d 523, 524-5J5
[127 P.2d 530] ; Donah1l.6 v. 8w~ew.e1l, 171 Cal 388, 391-392 (l5a P. 708];
W4UiomI v. llitW, 110 CaL 181, 6d (151 P. 1, .A.m1.Ou. 1916. 708).)

t;.pr.
It.
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~;whether made at,

before, or after the· execution of the instrufinent are admissible, if offered for the purpose of ascertaining
.the intent with which the instrument was executed (Estate of
202 Cal. 424, 435-436 [261 P. 298]; In re Kemp',
37 Del. 514, 523 [186 A. 890J ; Fleming v. MorrisonJ 187
120,122 [72 N.E. 499J ; Olark v. Hugo, 130 Va. 99 [107
730, 734J ; 6 Wigmore, Evidence, § 1736, p. 111; 1 UnderWills, § 39, p. 48), and not for the purpose of proving
meaning the testator attributed to specific provisions of
admitted will. (Oolton v. OoZtfm, 127 U.S. 300 [8 S.Ct.
32 L.Ed. 138] ; Estate of Pierce, 32 Ca1.2d 265, 274 [196
1] ; Estate of FareUy, 214 Cal. 199, 203 [4 P.2d 948] ;
Code, § 105.) "Such . . . declarations of intent to make
.will are admissible when the attempt is not to explain an
g",nhi...,'itv but to show the testamentary character of a letter."
ftBr,tate of Spie" 86 Cal.App.2d 87, 91 [194 P.2d 83] ; E,tate
_ . ".,...... 18 Cal.2d 512, 516 [116 P.2d 438] ; Estate of Siemer"
Cal. 424, 435 [261 P. 298] ; Estate 01 Morrison, 198 Cal.
6-8 [242 P. 939] ; EBtate 01 Spitzer, 196 Cal. 301, 306 [237
...U '..............

].)

BBtate 01 Smith, 31 Cal.2d 563 [191 P.2d 4131, is not incon!aiiJteIlt with the foregoing. That case involved an unequivocal
!ti'nre88 revocatory intent unaccompanied by any declaration
.·oo:ndlilct of the decedent inconsistent therewith. There was
endellce against the showing of the solemnly expressed
coexistent with the execution of the revocatory instruThe evidence established only that testatrix iIiformed
persons that she had made a will, the provisions of which
those of the instrument offered for probate. She did not
to the earlier revo6ation and offered no explanation of
Win.luonn" .. in writing it. A written revocation can be overby evidence that revocation was not intended, not
r··e'nacen<le that at some later time the testatrix wished the
be operative. The evidence of the decedent's subsequent
dec:1ar'atllons and conduct was held inadmissible because
. no bearing or relevancy under the facts to show an
different from that unequivocally expressed by the
voeatOlry writing. None of it disclosed conduct, or influences,
of mind at the time of the written revocation. Nor
declarations refer to the previous revocation. The
there relied on merely supported an inlerence that
~e(ledlent considered her will operative. The majority of

)
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this co:urt expressly recognized that the effect of such a duly
executed express revocatory instrument could not thus be
overcome.
This appeal does not present a case in which the trial court
erroneously excluded relevant extrinsic evidence. The evidence was admitted and considered by the trial court in determining whether the instrument offered for probate was executed with testamentary intent. The trial court concluded
that "said decedent executed said instrument of date of September 29, 1946, with the intention to create a revocable disposition of her property to accrue and take effect only upon her
death and pasSing no present interest' 'and that "said intent
to make such testamentary disposition of her property existed
at the time of the execution of said instrument. "
[5] It is true, as contestants assert, that the evidence of
decedent's declarations relative to the execution of the instrument is uncontradicted and unimpeached. This evidence,
however, is not so persuasive and unequivocal that it compels
the conclusion that decedent did not intend to make the testamentary disposition of her property that the instrument
directs. It only creates a conflict with other evidence introduced at the trial that supports the finding of the trial court.
Mrs. Lillian Shooshan was the niece of testatrix's deceased
husband; she had been living with the testatrix on hostile
terms. On the day the instrument was written she had been
particularly quarrelsome, insisting that she had been wrongfully excluded from the wills of the testatrix and her husband.
According to the testimony of her nurse, Mrs. Sargavak determined to have Mrs. Shooshan ejected from her house, and
called 'respondent Mahdesian for that purpose. When she
learned that he could Inot come that evening, she wrote the
instrument in question. The nurse testified in detail eoneerning the circumstances under which it was written:
., Q. Did you call Mr. Mahdesian at that time' A. I called
him that night. She asked me to call him and come and have
them put out of the house.
"Q. By referring to them, who did she mean' A. Mrs.
Lillian Shoostian [Shooshan] and Betty. her daughter.
"Q. You did call Mr. Mahdesian at her requesU A. I did,
and she called him also.

"Q. She called him' A. Yes.
"Q. Do you know what she said to him, A. She asked him
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come over; she wanted these parties put out of her house
they had disturbed her so all day."
The nurse also testified:
". ,. ' She said she had been so disturbed that day and was so
tired and worn out from trouble she had annoying her all
long with her niece and her niece's daughter; that she
't want them to be in her will at all, and she was writing
to fix it so they would know she didn't want them to have
to do with her will. "
,Kesp.:>D(lelllt Mahdesian saw the testatrix the next day and
ijsclWlSE!d the situation with her (Rep. Tr., pp. 27-29) :
Q. What happened when you got there Monday morning'
was just around eleven o'clock when I got there Monday
and greeted her. She was in bed.
She says' Where have you been' Why didn't you
",<>•• ~"'~rI~'''''' Which I gave her the reason why I didn't.
, she says, 'I want you to help me. Don't you know I
trouble"
said, 'Now let me worry about your troubles. What is

~;I)ec:awle

)

said, 'I want you to get Mrs. Shoostian out of the
away. I can't stand her any more. '
.' What is the trouble"
said, 'She is always harassing me, nagging me, and
me why we didn't leave anything for her in Harry's
uncle's will; why we gave so much money to the
and benevolent organizations,' andshesaid,' That
me. So I told her~hatis my oWn money. We can do
we want with our money.' She says, 'Again yesterme and quarreled with me all day, so I
something over here. I want you to take it and
read it. I said, 'What do you want us to do t'
. . 'Put Lillian Shoostian out of the house right

'Mrs. Sargavak, Mrs. Shoostian [Shooshan] is your
's niece. He has just passed away a short time ago,
. . '. put her out of the house people will say she was
her husband to die to put the relatives out.' I said,
Mrs. Shoostian.Just leave that to me.'
'Well, you know what best to do.'
I looked at the instrument and I said, 'What
me to do with this"

100
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"She said, ' As I told you, Mrs. Shoostian has been bothering
me and demanding money from me, and I am writing this
and I want you to take it and any time you need it to use it.'
"I said, 'Now what do you mean by this, that you want to
leave your belongings to your son, Sam Mahdesian and her
attorney, J. George Ohanneson and give them power Of
attorneyf'
" Well, she said, ' You' are the executor of Harry's estate,
and also you are the executor in my will, and Mr. Ohanne80n
is our attorney. I want you folks to prepare and take care of
my estate, my affairs, in the way that you know I want it.
And whenever Lillian Shoostian ever gives any trouble, I
want you to have this.' ..
.
The foregoing testimony indicates only that decedent'.
annoyance with Mrs. Shooshan and her daughter prompted the
writing of the instrument. If it was intended, as contestants
assert, only as a notification to Mrs. Shooshan and her daughter
that decedent" didn't want them to be in her will at all," the
testimony offers no explanation for the statement that "She
leaves everything she has to her Boy Sam Mahdesian & her
layer J. G. Ohanneson." Nothing in the evidence before the
trial court clearly negatives the testamentary implication
carried by those words. The impulse that prompted decedent
to exclude Mrs. Shooshan from any share in her estate does
not dispel the inference that at the same time she directed the
disposition of her property to the two men who had served
her and her husband as friends, counsel, and business advisers.
Although the testimony of Mahdesian and the nurse is
uncontradicted, other evidence introduced at the trial supports the inference that Mrs. Sargavak intended to make the
disposition of her property manifested by the terms of the
instrument. Decedent and her husband knew Mahdesian since
1906. They frequently referred to him as "our boy" and
"our son" and relied upon his aid and advice in the conduct
of business matters. At the time she wrote the instrument
offered for probate, decedent contemplated transferring title
to her home to Mahdesian if he and his wife would live with
her. Decedent and her husband knew Ohanneson since 1904.
Ohanneson met and courted his wife at their home. Mrs. Sargavak assisted in the delivery of Mrs. Ohanneson's first child
in 1913. Ohanneson represented the Sargavaks as their attorney. He was closely associated with Mr. Sargavak in religious
and charitable activities. He was a constant visitor at Mrs.

)
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bedside during the extended illness that eventually
.
.It cannot be said that it is unreasonable upon this evidence
conclude that Mrs. Sargavak, angered and harassed by Mrs;
rB1IlOOl!Ih&11l, decided to leave. her property to two men she had
ftJIlOWn for more than forty years and for whom she had demrDJIiStrateid a warm personal affection. This purpose is clearly
'~pl'E~d by the terms of the instrument. It is not negatived
evidence that she had an additional purpose, expressed in
. letter and corroborated by the testimony upon which conDstants rely, to avoid further annoyance from Mrs. Shooshan.
'. The inclusion of nontestamentary provisions with those of
lIl.testllUDlmtl!l.l'y' nature does not make the instrument moper&88 wiU. (Estate of Button, 209 Cal. 325, 331 [287 P.
)
order admitting the insttument to probate is aftirmed.

~Cause:d her death.

a

,p"/~~",,'.u.....,
IP.,A...... VA£ ...J

J.-I concur. It should be noted, however, that

hlold:ing here that "Regardless of the language

aDegedly testamentary instrument, extrinsic evidence
.be introduced to show that it was not intended by the
to be effective as a will . • . Since extrinsic evidence
'~adnwlBiblle to show the absence of testamentary intention,
not become inadmissible because it does so by showing
intention," is irreconcilably inconsistent with the
holding in Esiate of Smith (1948), 31 Cal.2d 563,
P .2d 413], that eVidence of "extraneous occurrences
(~ecIllratiOltl8 claimed to bear upon the intent to revoke"
not ~ received, "cannot overcome the valid [on its
U,lmlIlSrevocation," and is "not admissible to show that
~~. [on its face] revocation clause W88 not intended to
prior wiU. "
bas been suggested no tenable basis for applying an
-Dal7 rule of evidence to the question of intent arising
"""T~.'--'- case and a contrary rule to the same question
now before us. For the sake of uniformity of
either the majority holding of the Smith case should
ijcRiarelly overruled or it should be followed here and all
the subject of intent be held inadmissible.

ift&/m....,..

)

J.-I dissent.
in the opinion of the court that resort may always
extrinsic evidence to explain the actual intention
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with which an apparently testamentary instrument was executed and that the trial court properly admitted such evidf'nce
In my opinion. however, that ('vidence, unequivocal, uncon·
tradicted. and unimpeached, clearly demonstrates that Mrs.
Sargavak did not intend by the letter of September 29. 1946.
to direct the testamentary disposition of her property and
the letter !;hould not have been admitted to probate.
It is held that since the letter furnishes rational support
for the finding of the trial court that it was executed with
testamentary intent, the finding must be affirmed on appeal.
The cases cited for the proposition that the extrinsic evidence
was properly admitted, however, are also authority for the
proposition that a finding of testamentary intent contrary to
that evidence cannot be upheld even though it is supported
by the terms and appearance of the questioned instrument. If
the instrument cannot reasonably be found to be testamentary
when read alone, there is no need to resort to extrinsic evidence. In most of the cited cases, not only was the language of
the instrument indicative of testamentary intent, it was not
indicative of any other. Nevertheless, when the evidence
clearly demonstrates that the instrument so construed does
not represent the true intention of the writer, it must be denied
probate. (Estate of Kenyon, 42 Cal.App.2d 423, 425 (l09
P.2d 38J ; Estate of Major, 89 Cal.App. 238, 242 [264 P. 542J ;
Smith v. Smith, 112 Va. 205 [70 S.E. 491] ; Rennie v. Washington Trust 00., 140 Wash. 472 [249 P. 992] ; see 1 Underhill, Wills, § 39, pp. 47-48.) Thus in the case of a law student
who draws a practice will solely as a classroom exercise, uncontradicted evidence of this fact by the instructor and members
of the class would overcome any indication of testamentary
intent from the instrument itself. Although such an instrument might be written meticulously and in strict conformity
with statutory requirements, it would not be entitled to probate, since the writer would not intend that it accomplish a
testamentary disposition of his property.
Sometimes extrinsic evidence offered to contradict the
apparently testamentary character of an instrument establishes that the decedent executed the instrument written in
terms not his own, the legal import of which he neither realized nor intended, as in In re WiUiams' Estate (Tex.Civ.
App.) , 135 S.W.2d 1078, where the decedent executed the
instrument under the impression that it was a mortgage.
Again, the evidence may establish that the decedent executed
an instrument that met the formal requirements for a will,

,.
!>.

F

.;, Apr. 1950]
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~. even that he intended .that the instrument appear to be 8

r will, but that his actual design

was not that the instrument

~ have testamentary effeci~ but that it serve a nontestamentary

;' purpose not embodied in the instrument. (Lister v. Smith, 3
( S.iT. 282; Estate o/Siemers, 202 Cal. 424, 435 [261 P. 298] ;
! 1'leming v. Morrison, 187 Mass. 120, 123 [72 N.E. 499].) In
t:11leming v. MOf'f"ison, supra, the decedent, to induce a young
woman to engage in illicit relations with him, executed a
'.' formal witnessed instrument designed to appear as a will,
;n8ming her as' sole legatee. He showed it to her as hii will,
. Ultending actually that it have no testamentary effect. The
trial court, relying upon the testamentary appearance of the
< instrument,
admitted it to probate. The appellate court
•reversed the order of admission, holding that it WflS error for
·the trial court to attribute any weight to the testamentary
'appearance of the instrument, since the decedent did not
mtend the instrument to be testamentary.. (See, also, Estate
.:'1 Kenyon, 42 Cal.App.2d 423, 425 [109 P.2d 38].) In each
'of the foregoing cases, the writer of the instrument did not
~ihereby express or intend to express his actual intention;
:the terms of the instrument were designed to have .no operative
t effect. The courts have therefore consistently held that when
kthe evidence of the writer's actual intention is clear, convinciiDg, and uncontradicted it is error to rely on evidence of a
feontrary intention appearing from the terms of the instrut~'J.Ilent alone. (Olark v. Hugo, 130 Va. 99 [107 S.E. 730, 733] ;
.,.. re Williams' Estate (Tex.Civ.App.), 135 S.W.2d 1078,
,ibs2; Estate 0/ Kenyon, 42 Cal.App.2d 423, 425 [109 P.2d 38] ;
"-;#ennie v. Washington Trust 00., 140 Wash. 472, 479 [249
.:P.992] ; In re Willing's Estate, 212 Pa. 136 [61 A. 812, 814] ;
, " ession 01 Torlage, 202 La. 693, 698.)
f,Often, however,!the evidence will indicate that the decedent
tight to accomplish a specific purpose by the terms of the
,ent and that this intention was expressed, although'
tJnperfectly, by the words chosen, but that the intention was
~~ntestamentary.. That is this case. The court cannot disre~pd, the terms of the instrument but must construe them
. ther with the extrinsic evidence to determine their mean." .. When the construction of the instrument is based solely
"its terms without the aid of extrinsic evidence, or with the
. ~'of extrinsic evidence that is without conffict, "it is the
. . of the appellate court . . . to interpret the document
, ependent of the construction· given to it by the trier of
fJ

"
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the fact, and to make a final determination in accordance with
the applicable principles of law." (Estate of Norris, 78 Cal.
App.2d 152, 159 [177 P.2d 299] ; Estate of Platt, 21 Cal.2d
343,352 [131 P.2d 825] ; Union Oil Co. v. Union Suga,. Co.,
31 Ca1.2d 300, 306, 318 [188 P.2d 470J ; Trubowitch v. River.
bank Canning Co., 30 Cal.2d 335, 339 [182 P.2d 182] ; Western
Coal ~ Mining Co. v. Jones, 27 Ca1.2d 819, 826-827 [167 P.2d
719, 164 A.L.R. 685] ; First Trust ~ Savings Bank v. Costa,
83 Cal.App.2d 368, 372 (188 P.2d 778] ; Estate of O'Brien,
74 Cal.App.2d 405, 407 [168 P.2d 432J; Lane·Wells Co. v.
8cklttmberger WeZl Su,.veying Corp., 65 Cal.App.2d 180, 184
[150 P.2d 251] ; Moffatt v. Tight,44 Cal.App.2d 643, 648 [112
P.2d 910] ; Landres v. Rosasco, 62 Cal.App.2d 99, 105 [144
P.2d20].)
In the present case, the extrinsic evidence is clear and
unequivocal, uncontradicted and unimpeached. It demon·
strates unmistakably that Mrs. Sargavak did not intend to
direct a testamentary disposition of her property by the letter
offered for probate. On the basis of that evidence, the letter
should be denied probate notwithstanding the contrary find·
ing of the trial court. (See In re Kimmel's Edate, 278 Pa.
435 [123 A. 405,406].)
The testimony of Mrs. Sargavak's nurse, set forth at length
in the opinion of the court, demonstrates that the only motive
for writing the letter was nontestamentary. No other con·
struction can reasonably be placed on the testimony that:
"She said she had been so disturbed that day and was so
very tired and worn out from trouble she had annoying her all
day long with her niece and her niece's daughter; that she
didn't want them to be in her will at all, and she was writing
this to fix it so they would know she didn't want them to
have anything to po with her will. "
Mrs. Sargavak again stated her motive for writing the
letter, to respondent Mabdesian the following day:
"She said, 'She is always harassing me, nagging me, and
telling me why we didn't leave anything for her in Harry's
will, her uncle's will; why we gave so much money to the
churches and benevolent organizations,' and she said, 'That
disturbs me. So I told her that is my own money. We can do
whatever we want with our money.' She says, 'Again yester.
day she disturbed me and quarreled with me all day, so I
have written something over here. I want you to take it and
read it.'
AI Mabdesian'. testimony quoted in the opinion of the
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court indicates, Mrs. Sargavak wrote the letter with reference
to the provisions of an existing will, to inform Mrs. Shoosban
that she would receive nothing thereunder, and to empower
Mahdesian to eject Mrs. Shooshan from her house. That she
did not also intend thereby to direct the disposition of her
property to Mahdesian and Ohanneson is unequivocally dem, onstrated by her answer to Mahdesian's query with respect to
the allegedly dispositive provision:
.. ',' "I said, 'Now what do you mean by this, that you want to
11eave your belongings to your son, Sam Mahdesian and her
attorney, J. George Ohanneson and give them power of
attorney!'
" "Well, she said, 'You are the executor of Harry's estate,
also you are the executor in my will, and Mr. Ohanneson
our attorney. I want you folks to prepare and take care of
estate, my affairs, in the way that you know I want it.
whenever Lillian Shoostian ever gives any trouble, I
a"._A9." you to have this.' "
The declarations of the decedent before and after she wrote
letter preclude an inference that sh(' intended thereby to
....'....__ ...- a testamentary disposition of her property. She bad
aIr'BaOlV executed a formal witnessed will dated July 9, 1945.
. her conversations with the nurse and with Mahdesian she
tiiOn.tiJJlually referred to ,. my will," demonstrating her con":"rltofo';nn that it was still operative.
.
is undisputep that decedent's annoyance with Mrs. Shooand her daughter prompted the writing of the letter.
letter was intended as a notification to Mrs. Shooshan
she and her daughter would receive nothing under dece'8 will. That purpose is clearly established by her stateto the nurse "that she didn't want them to be in her
at all, and she was writing this to fix it so they would
. that she didn't want them to have anything to do with
. "To accomplish her purpose, Mrs. Sargavak did not
.' to change her will, since neither Mrs. Sbooshan nor her
J,GUKlllA::.l'" were mentioned therein. Her reference to the letter
notification to Mrs. Shooshan and her daugbter that she
want them "to have anything to do with her will"
.
that she meant to affirm her will, not to revoke
existence of a previously executed and unrevoked
will, to which the testatrix continually referred and
she still considered operative, reinforces the conclusion
.. did not intend its revocation by an informal letter
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that made no reference thereto. (Estate of Spencer, 87 Cal.
App.2d 591, 598 [197 P.2d 351] ; White v. Deering, 38 Cal.
App. 433, 438 [177 P. 516] ; Estate of Branick, 172 Cal. 482
[157 P. 238] ; Estate of Hughes, 140 Cal.App. 97, 100-101
[35 P.2d 204].)
This interpretation is confirmed by Mahdesian's uncontradicted testimony as to her explanation of the provision in the
letter that she left everything to him and Ohanneson. Although
that provision could be deemed dispository if it stood alone
(cf., McCloskey v. Tierney, 141 Cal. 101, 102 [74 P. 699, 99
Am.St.Rep. 33] ; Innes v. Potter, 130 Minn. 320 [153 N.W.
604]), her explanation that "You are the executor of Harry's
estate, and also you are the executor in my will, and Mr.
Ohanneson is our attorney. I want you folks to prepare and
take care of my estate, my affairs, in the way that you know
I want it" establishes that she wished her executor and her
attorney to administer her estate under the terms of the will
with which as executor and draftsman, respectively, they were
familiar. Mahdesian was then acting as executor of her husband's will, and she was aware of an executor's responsibility
for the administration of an estate until final distribution.
Her purpose was not to make her executor and her attorney her
legatees, but to provide them with an instrument that would
demonstrate to Mrs. Shooshan that the latter would get none
of the property that they were to distribute under her will.
The evidence makes it clear that Mrs. Sargavak did not
intend to revoke her will, for her statements demonstrate that
she regarded that will as still operative. Such was Mahdesian's
understanding of her statements, although he would have been
materially benefited by the interpretation urged by respondent
Ohanneson. After the death of Mrs. Sargavak, Mahdesian
tried unsuccessfully to get Mrs. Shooshan to leave the house,
and then consulted Ohanneson as the decedent's attorney:
"Then I called the attention of this to Mr. Ohanneson, 'Mrs.
Shoostian refuses to leave, and here is a paper written by
Mrs. Sargavak to the effect that Mrs. Shoostian is not to get
anything. '
"Then Mr. Ohanneson looked at it, studied it. 'No,' he
said, 'Sam, that has another meaning, too.' He says, 'You
and I are becoming the heirs to her estate. '
"My attitude in the matter was-I said, 'George, I cannot
have a share in a thing like this.' I said, 'You have drawn
Mr. Sargavak's and Mrs. Sargavak's will. You know what
their desire was. You know what their wiahea were. Mr.
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Sargavak earned that money and he has passed away, and
I cannot give an interpretation to this power of attorney in
this way. I cannot have any share.'
"Well, he says, 'that is up to you. If you don't want to
have a part to it, you can waive your claim, but thls is a
codicil, and half of it comes to you and half of it comes to
me, and I am going to get my share. '
"My next statement to him was, 'George, when I shave in
·the morning I want to respect myself when I look in the
· mirror, and I can't do it taking advantage of a thing like

this.' "

)

The trial court could not have reached its conclusion without
disregarding the foregoing evidence. A trier of fact may dis- .
· believe unimpeached testimony when its disbelief is warranted
.' by the motives or interest of the witness or by contradictions
· appearing in the evidence (Huth v. Katz, 30 Cal.2d 605. 609
: ' [184 P .2d 521] ), but here there is no basis for disbelief. The
n,urse had no apparent motive for falsifying her testimony,
· and respondent suggests none. Mahdesian would have been a
· legatee of an estate worth approximately $24,000 if tht' letter
admitted to probate; he had nothing to gain by testifying
. circumstances establishing that it was not intended as a
The testimony of both witnesses was completely eona;1I!""'~':U~ with all the evidence adduced at the trial. Respondent
1!""B't>11'<! no ground upon which the testimony could be disbenor doC's he even contend that it was false. "Testimony
1I1r,tu~:.b. is not inherently improbable and is not impeached or
by other evidence should be accepted as true
trier of fact." ~Gomez v. Oecena, 15 Ca1.2d 363, 366
P.2d 477] ; Southern Pac. 00. v. Railroad Oom., 13 Ca1.2d
129 [87 P.2d 1052] ; Nye ~ Nissen, Inc. v. Oentral Surety
Oorp., 71 Cal.App.2d 570, 576-577 [163 P.2d
'j Fidelity ~ Oasualty 00. v.' Abraham, 70 Cal.App.2d
782 [161 P.2d 689] ; Oowan v. Hill, 109 Cal.App. 656,
[293 P. 871].) An examination of the letter in the light
,evidence leaves no room for any conclusion other than
it was not written with testamentary intent. I would
1S1"II1f0l~ reverse the order admitting the letter to probate.
I . . . . . . V., •.L

J., and Edmonds, J., concurred.
~~_vvc.u.'CUJ.'.!:I'

and contestants and respondenta' petitions for
were denied May 8,1950. Shenk, J., Edmonds, J.,
1iI']'pjlVll,nl". J .• voted for a rehearing.
"UU.t::.LrJll..-

